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A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EVALUATION
OF THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE
NEW PENSION REFORMS IN ITALY
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Population ageing, determined by the increase in life expectancy, the reduction of fertility
rates and, most of all, the baby-boom produced during the Fifties and Sixties, will be a com-
mon characteristic of most of all industrialized countries over the next decades. The aim of
this paper is to provide an evaluation of the economic consequences of population ageing
in Italy. The Italian case is a very interesting case for two reasons: first, in Italy, the de-
mographic problem is one of the most serious in the world (only Japan will exhibit greater
old-age dependency ratios, i.e. the ratio of the number of people aged 65 and more to the
working age population); by considering that the Italian pension system is almost entirely
composed of a compulsory public Pay-As-You-Go system, it will be extremely exposed to
the demographic evolution; second, since 1992, many reforms have been introduced by the
Italian governments in order to face the demographic problem: the Amato reform in 1992,
the Dini reform in 1995, the Berlusconi reform in 2004 and the Prodi reform in 2007.
The Amato and the Dini reforms induce a strong reduction in the generosity of the Italian
pension system by introducing (1) an indexation mechanism of pension benefits to prices
instead of to real wages, (2) a new method of computation of pension benefits (contribution
based method) where benefits are related to the contributions paid during the whole working
life. Even if these reforms would induce a significant reduction in future pension benefits,
they are generally considered not sufficient to face the ageing problem, in particular because
of the too much long transition phase imposed by the Dini reform: in fact, the contribution
based method will be completely applied after 2030. In 2004, the Berlusconi government
introduced a new reform that increased the minimum retirement age to 60 from January 2008
onwards while, before the reform, individuals were free to retire at 57. In 2007, in particular
given the strong opposition exerted by Italian’s trade unions, the Prodi government replaced
the Berlusconi reform with a softer one: the minimum retirement age is fixed at 58 from
January 2008 and will gradually increase over time up to 62.
Using an overlapping-generations model, we first show that the reforms introduced in the
Nineties imply a very important reduction in the replacement ratios. Thus, these reforms
allow controlling the evolution of the pension expenditure by penalizing early retirement.
Nevertheless, these reforms fail to ensure long-run solvability of the Italian pension system
and, during the transition phase, the pension system would produce deficits higher than 3% of
GDP. This implies that over the next decades, the level of taxation will significantly increase
in order to reduce public deficits and thus fulfil Maastricht obligations. The analysis of the
recent pension reforms shows that the increase in the retirement age induces a significant
improvement of the financial conditions of the pension system only in the short and in the
medium run. After 2035, the positive effect related to the increase in the labor supply, and
then in contributions paid by the workers, is compensated by the increase in the value of
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pension benefits perceived by people forced to postpone retirement. In the long run, the
increase in the retirement age has no positive impact on the financial conditions of the pension
system and the pension deficit remains at about 1.7% of GDP in 2055.
In Europe, even if pension systems remain essentially different, some similar measures have
been introduced in order to reduce the pension expenditure burden: the indexation of pension
benefits to prices, the increase in the retirement age and the increase of the role of private
funding. In France, for example, the Fillon reform introduced in France in 2003 increases
the number of years necessary to obtain the full replacement ratio. With respect to the Italian
reform that increases the minimum retirement age, with the Fillon reform individuals are free
to choose the retirement age. Moreover, the French reform avoids the problem related to the
long-run inefficiency of the Berlusconi and Prodi reforms. In fact, with the French reform, if
the employment rates of elder workers do not change, the reform permits a strong reduction
in pension expenditure because of the application of a penalization while, if the employment
rates of elder workers increase, the pension expenditure do not change and the contributions
received by the government increase. In both cases, the French reform allows a permanent
reduction in pension deficits. However, even if in the French case the demographic problem
is less serious than in Italy, the Italian reforms are globally much more efficient that those
introduced in France in order to control the evolution of pension expenditures. Of course, the
cost associated to this greater efficiency is the strong reduction of the generosity of the Italian
pension system produced by the Amato and Dini reforms.
ABSTRACT
Most European countries have recently introduced pension system reforms to face the finan-
cial problem related to population ageing. Italy is not an exception. The reforms introduced
during the Nineties (Amato Reform in 1992 and Dini Reform in 1995), even if they will pro-
duce a strong reduction in pension benefits, are generally thought not sufficient to adequately
face the population ageing problem. For this reason, in 2004, the Berlusconi government
introduced a new reform that increases the retirement age to 60 years from January 2008
onwards, to 61 years from 2010 and to 62 from 2014. In 2007, the left-wing government
replaced this reform with a softer one that fixes the minimum retirement age at 58 from 2008.
Using an applied overlapping-generations general equilibrium model, we analyze the impact
of the new reforms on the macroeconomic system and in particular on the long-run sustain-
ability of the pension system. We show that the increase in the retirement age would permit
to reduce pension deficits in the short and medium run, while in the long run these reforms
would become ineffective.
JEL Classification: D58, H55, J10.
Keywords: pension reforms, applied OLG models, immigration, endogenous growth.
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EVALUATION DES NOUVELLES RÉFORMES DE RETRAITES EN ITALIE : UNE
APPROCHE D’ÉQUILIBRE GÉNÉRAL
RESUME NON TECHNIQUE
Le vieillissement démographique, provoqué par l’augmentation de l’espérance de vie, la
baisse de la fécondité et le baby-boom des années 50 et 60, caractérisera les pays indus-
trialisés dans les décennies futures. L’objectif de ce papier est d’évaluer les conséquences
économiques du vieillissement démographique en Italie. Le cas italien est intéressant pour
deux raisons. D’abord, la situation démographique en Italie est parmi les plus préoccupantes
au monde (seule le Japon présente un taux de dépendance, c’est-à-dire le ratio entre le nombre
de personnes âgées de plus de 65 ans sur la population en âge de travailler, plus élevé) ; le
système de retraite italien reposant presque entièrement sur un système public par réparti-
tion, il sera très exposé au vieillissement. Ensuite, à partir de 1992, plusieurs réformes ont été
mises en place : la réforme Amato en 1992, la réforme Dini en 1995, la réforme Berlusconi
en 2004 et la réforme Prodi en 2007.
Les réformes Amato et Dini réduisent fortement la générosité du système de retraite en intro-
duisant (1) un mécanisme d’indexation des retraites sur les prix, (2) un nouveau système de
calcul des retraites où la valeur de la retraite est liée aux cotisations versées pendant toute la
durée du travail. Même si ces réformes entraînent une baisse importante des pensions, elles
sont généralement considérées comme insuffisantes pour équilibrer le système, en particulier
à cause de la phase de transition très longue prévue par la réforme Dini. En 2004, le gouver-
nement Berlusconi a introduit une nouvelle réforme qui relève l’âge minimum de départ à la
retraite alors que, avant cette réforme, il était possible de partir à la retraite à 57 ans. En 2007,
en particulier à cause de la forte opposition des syndicats, le gouvernement Prodi a remplacé
la réforme Berlusconi par une nouvelle réforme plus souple : l’âge minimum de départ à la
retraite est fixé à 58 ans à partir de 2008 et augmentera progressivement jusqu’à 62 ans.
A l’aide d’un modèle d’équilibre général à générations imbriquées, nous montrons que les
réformes introduites dans les années 90 conduisent à une baisse importante des taux de rem-
placement. Ces réformes permettent ainsi de contrôler les dépenses du système de retraite en
pénalisant le départ à la retraite anticipé. Cependant, ces réformes n’assurent pas l’équilibre
de long terme et, pendant la phase de transition, le système produit des déficits supérieurs
à 3% du PIB. Cela impliquerait, dans les décennies futures, une augmentation considérable
du niveau de taxation pour réduire les déficits publics et respecter les obligations de Maas-
tricht. L’analyse des réformes récentes montre que l’augmentation de l’âge de départ à la
retraite permet une amélioration significative de la situation financière du système de retraite
uniquement dans les court et moyen termes. En revanche, après 2035, l’effet positif lié à
l’augmentation de l’offre de travail et donc des cotisations versées est compensé par l’aug-
mentation de la valeur des pensions perçues par les travailleurs qui retardent leur départ à la
retraite. Ainsi, à long terme, l’augmentation de l’âge de départ à la retraite n’a pas d’effet sur
la situation financière du système de retraite et, en 2055, le déficit reste de 1,7% du PIB.
Ailleurs en Europe, même si les systèmes de retraite restent assez différents, la plupart des
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pays ont adopté des mesures similaires afin de limiter l’augmentation future des dépenses
liées aux retraites : l’indexation des retraites aux prix, l’augmentation de l’âge de départ à
la retraite, l’augmentation du rôle des fonds de pension. En France, par exemple, la réforme
Fillon introduite en 2003 prévoit l’augmentation du nombre d’années nécessaires pour ob-
tenir une retraite au taux plein. Par rapport à la réforme italienne qui augmente l’âge mini-
mum de départ à la retraite, la réforme Fillon a d’abord l’avantage de laisser la liberté aux
travailleurs de choisir la date de leur départ à la retraite. De plus, elle permet d’éviter le pro-
blème d’inefficacité de long terme des réformes Berlusconi et Prodi. En fait, avec la réforme
française, si les taux d’emploi des seniors ne se modifient pas, la réforme permet une baisse
considérable des dépenses grâce à l’application de la décote ; si, par contre, les taux d’emploi
des seniors augmentent, les dépenses du système de retraite restent identiques et les cotisa-
tions perçues par les caisses de retraite augmentent ; dans les deux cas, la réforme française
permet de réduire de façon permanente les déficits du système de retraite. Cependant, même
si dans le cas français le problème démographique est moins aigu qu’en Italie, les réformes
introduites en Italie sont nettement plus efficaces que celles introduites en France du point de
vue de l’évolution des dépenses du système de retraite. Evidemment, le coût associé à cette
plus grande efficacité est la forte réduction de la générosité du système de retraite italien suite
aux réformes Amato et Dini.
RESUME COURT
La plupart des pays européens ont récemment introduit des réformes du système de retraite
pour faire face au problème financier lié au vieillissement démographique. L’Italie n’est
pas une exception. Les réformes introduites dans les années 90 (réforme Amato en 1992 et
réforme Dini en 1995), même si elles produisent une baisse considérable des pensions, sont
généralement considérées comme insuffisantes. Pour cette raison, en 2004, le gouvernement
Berlusconi a introduit une nouvelle réforme qui augmente l’âge de départ à la retraite à 60
ans à partir de 2008, à 61 ans à partir de 2010 et à 62 ans à partir de 2014. En 2007, le
gouvernement Prodi a remplacé la réforme précédente par une plus souple qui augmente l’âge
de départ à la retraite à 58 ans à partir de 2008. A l’aide d’un modèle OLG, nous analysons
l’impact des nouvelles réformes sur le système macroéconomique et sur la soutenabilité du
système de retraite. Nous montrons que l’augmentation de l’âge de départ à la retraite permet
de réduire considérablement les déficits du système de retraite à court et à moyen terme, alors
qu’à long terme ces réformes deviennent inefficaces.
Classification JEL : D58, H55, J10
Mots clés : réformes du système de retraite, modèles OLG, immigration, croissance endo-
gène.
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A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EVALUATION OF THE NEW PENSION
REFORMS IN ITALY
Riccardo MAGNANI1
1. INTRODUCTION
Industrialized countries will know a phase of significant demographic changes over
the next 50 years. The increase in life expectancy, the reduction of fertility rates
and, most of all, the baby-boom produced during the Fifties and Sixties have induced
a population ageing that will put the financing of the social security systems under
considerable stress. Italian demographics are quite representative of this largely Eu-
ropean phenomenon. The demographic projections based on the central hypothesis
presented by Istat (2006) show that the working age population - the number of peo-
ple between 20 and 64 - will drop by 23% between 2000 and 2050 (Figure 1) and the
old-age dependency ratio - the ratio of the number of people aged 65 and more to the
working age population - will increase from 28.9% in 2000 to 68.1% in 2050 (Figure
2).
Figure 1: Working age population. Source:
Istat, 2006
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Figure 2: Old-age dependency ratio.
Source: Istat, 2006
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To face this problem, most European countries have recently introduced pension sys-
tem reforms. Even if European pension systems remain essentially different, some
similar measures have been introduced in order to reduce the pension expenditure
burden: the indexation of pension benefits to prices, the increase in the retirement
1CEPII (riccardo.magnani@cepii.fr). I am grateful to Agnès Benassy-Quéré and Martine Carré for
useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
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age and the increase of the role of private funding. However, the pay-as-you-go sys-
tem is still largely the most important pillar of European pension systems.
During the Nineties, two reforms of the pension system were implemented in Italy,
the Amato reform (1992), and the Dini reform (1995). Even if these reforms would
induce a significant reduction in future pension benefits, they are unanimously re-
garded as being non sufficient in the medium run - because of the long transition
phase imposed by the Dini reform that will produce important social security deficits
- as well as in the long run: even when completely applied, the reforms cannot be
expected to achieve the financial equilibrium of the pension system.2 In addition,
the impacts on the macroeconomic system are likely to be negative: pension sys-
tem deficits generate a fall in national savings, reduce capital accumulation and slow
down economic growth.
As a consequence, a new pension system reform seemed inevitable and in 2004, the
Berlusconi government decided to increase the minimum retirement age to 60 from
January 2008 onwards. The Berlusconi reform, even if it would produce a significant
reduction of the pension expenditures in the short term, has been considered deeply
unfair with respect to the generations born after 1948. For this reason, and given the
pressure exerted by Italian’s trade unions, the left-wing Prodi government replaced in
2007 the Berlusconi reform with a softer one: the minimum retirement age is fixed at
58 from January 2008, and it will gradually increase over time up to 62.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate and compare the Berlusconi and the Prodi re-
forms. We evaluate the effects on the pension system and on the macroeconomy of
the increase in the retirement age proposed by the new reforms. We show that the
Prodi reform induces an important reduction in pension deficits in the medium run,
but less important than the reduction that could be induced by the Berlusconi reform.
However, these two new reforms become completely ineffective in the long run.
Our assessment is based on simulation exercises using an applied overlapping-generations
general equilibrium model. A dynamic general equilibrium perspective is indeed re-
quired in order to evaluate the effects of pension reforms on the macroeconomy and
on the pension system, since population ageing will significantly affect labor supply
(and thus the evolution of wages) and capital accumulation (and thus the evolution of
investments, interest rates and GDP). The evolution of wages directly affects the evo-
2A partial equilibrium analysis carried out by the Italian Ministry of Labor and Social Policies
(Nucleo di Valutazione della Spesa Previdenziale, 2006) shows that, even by considering very optimistic
assumptions (the revision of the transformation coefficients, a 1.8% long run productivity growth rate,
and an increase in the employment rate of people 15-64 from 57.5% in 2005 to 67.9% in 2050), the
ratio of pension expenditures to GDP will deeply increase in the period 2010-2035, then it decreases
and in 2050 the ratio displays the same value as in 2005.
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lution of social security contributions, whereas the evolution of GDP growth rates,
with the application of the Dini reform, affects the evolution of pension benefits.
The model used in this paper is of the type pioneered by Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987), though with significant differences: we introduce mortality, immigration, hu-
man capital accumulation, and endogenous growth. The introduction of mortality
and immigration makes it possible to accurately reproduce the demographic projec-
tions and to simulate the effects of changes in immigration flows. The introduction
of human capital makes it possible to introduce a mechanism of endogenous growth
based on the average level of knowledge present in the economy à la Lucas (1988).
Human capital accumulation results from explicit decision making by young people
to invest time in education.
An important aspect related to population ageing is the effects of demographic change
and pension reforms on education decisions and consequently on economic growth.3
Indeed, relative factor prices are likely to vary significantly in the next decades hence
affecting the decision to invest or not in human capital. One can expect that the
impact of population ageing on human capital formation will be positive, since ageing
would boost wages and reduce interest rates, and that the increase in retirement age
would encourage individuals to devote more time to schooling. The positive impact
on economic growth could be important4 and, as a consequence, produce positive
effects on the financial situation of the pension system.
Our model treats Italy as a closed economy. The degree of the financial openness is
a very important aspect (see Börsch-Supan (2006), Aglietta et al. (2007), Chateau
et al. (2008)) since it affects the determination of the interest rate that affects the
evolution of the public debt, the evolution of capital accumulation, the economic
growth, and so on. By considering that ageing is a worldwide phenomenon, assuming
a fixed and constant interest rate would be misleading. This is why we preferred to
consider Italy as a closed economy in order to generate an endogenous interest rate
that is compatible with a world ageing context. However, when considering a specific
pension reform in Italy, the world interest rate can be considered exogenous. For this
reason, in the last section, we did a robustness check in which we consider Italy as
a small open economy where the interest rate is fixed at the level computed in the
benchmark case.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we describe the characteristics
of the Italian pension system and the reforms recently introduced. In sections 3 and
3Other OLG models including an endogenous growth mechanism based on human capital are pro-
vided by Fougère and Mérette (1999), Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2003) and Bouzahzah et al. (2002).
4people aged 25 and more induces an increase in the economic growth rate of 0.44% per year.
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4, we describe the structure of the OLG model and its calibration. Section 5 presents
the simulation results concerning the Berlusconi and the Prodi reforms. Section 6
presents some sensitivity analysis concerning the immigration, the value of pension
benefits and the hypothesis of financial openness. We draw our conclusions in the
last section.
2. THE ITALIAN PENSION SYSTEM
The Italian pension system is almost entirely composed of a compulsory public Pay-
As-You-Go system. An important anomaly of the Italian pension system is that there
is no clear separation between the pension system in its strict sense and the system
of social aids in which benefits are not related to contributions. In particular, the
Italian pension system includes pensions related to work (old-age pensions, disability
pensions, pensions paid in the case of occupational diseases and industrial injuries),
and other pensions (survival pensions, and welfare benefits for people aged 65 and
more lacking adequate means of support). In particular, in 2005:5
- IVS pensions (old-age pensions, pensions to survivors and disability benefits) ac-
counted for 13.64% of GDP with 18.383 millions pensions paid. The average
pension benefit was 10557 euros.
- Pensions paid in the case of occupational diseases and industrial injuries accounted
for 0.30% of GDP with one million pensions paid. The average pension benefit
was 4132 euros.
- Social assistance pensions (for people aged 65 and more lacking adequate means
of support) accounted for 1.16% of GDP with 3.841 millions pensions paid.
The average pension benefit was 4306 euros.
- Total pensions then accounted for 15.10% of GDP with 23.257 millions pensions
paid. The average pension benefit was 9239 euros.
During the Nineties two reforms were introduced in order to reduce future total pen-
sion expenditures and to harmonize the different pension regimes:6 the Amato reform
in 1992 and the Dini reform in 1995.
5Istat (2007), Statistiche della previdenza e dell’assistenza sociale. I trattamenti pensionistici. Anno
2005.
6Until 1992 the Italian pension system was characterized by a very large number of funds and
schemes, in which contributions and benefit rules varied according to the sector (private or public sec-
tor, or self-employment). The harmonization process of the different pension regimes, in particular
concerning public and private employees, was accelerated by the Law 449/1997.
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The most important innovations of the Amato reform (Law 421/1992) were (i) the
indexation of pension benefits on inflation, and not on real wages;7 (ii) the increase
of the age requirement to be entitled to an old-age pension from 60 for men and 55
for women with at least 15 years of contributions to 65 for men and 60 for women
with at least 20 years of contributions.
The Dini reform (Law 335/1995) introduced the following rules for the computation
of the pension benefits:
- For people who started working after 1995, the pension benefits are computed ac-
cording to a new rule: the contribution based method. In this case, the con-
tributions paid during the whole working life are virtually capitalized at the
average rate of growth of nominal GDP; the value of the pension is equal to the
capitalized value of the contributions multiplied by a transformation coefficient
depending on the retirement age.
- For people who had more than 18 years of contributions in 1995, the pension ben-
efits remain computed according to the earning based method, i.e. on the basis
of the average of the labor incomes earned during the 10 last years for salaried
workers and the 15 last years for self-employed workers.
- For people who in 1995 totalized less than 18 years of contributions, the pension
benefits are computed according to the pro-rata method. In this case, the pen-
sion benefits are given by a weighted average of the pension computed with the
earning based method and the contribution based method.
With the Dini reform, the eligibility requirements to be entitled to a seniority pension
were set as follows:
- For salaried workers aged more than 57, 35 years of contributions are required;
- For self-employed workers, 40 years of contributions are required; and it is reduced
to 35 years of contributions if the person is more than 58.
Workers can thus decide to retire at 57, with at least 35 years of contributions. The
main goal of the Dini reform was to penalize early retirement. In fact, with the con-
tribution based method, if an individual works less the value of pension benefits will
be lower since he/she accumulates a lower amount of contributions and the transfor-
mation coefficient applied will be also lower.
7This reform allows important reduction in pension expenditures especially in periods with sustained
economic growth since contributions grow at a high rate while pension benefits paid to people already
retired remain constant in real terms.
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In 2004, the Berlusconi government introduced a new reform (Law 243/2004) that
increased the minimum retirement age. According to this reform, the eligibility re-
quirements would become 40 years of contributions or 35 years of contributions at
the age of 60 for salaried workers and 61 for self-employed workers starting from
2008. The minimum retirement age would be increased by one year in 2010 and by
another year in 2014.
The Berlusconi reform was replaced by the one introduced by the Prodi government
in 2007 (Law 247/2007). With the new reform, the increase of the minimum retire-
ment age is more gradual: in 2008, the minimum retirement age for salaried workers
is 58 with at least 35 years of contributions. From 2009 onwards, the eligibility re-
quirements are related to the sum of the retirement age and the number of years of
contributions. In 2009, salaried workers aged no less than 59 can retire if the sum
is equal to 95. In 2011, salaried workers aged no less than 60 can retire if the sum
is equal to 96. From 2013 onwards, salaried workers aged no less than 61 can retire
if the sum is equal to 97. For self-employed workers, the minimum retirement age
is given by the minimum retirement age for salaried workers plus one year. Table 1
summarizes the aspects of the Berlusconi reform and Prodi reforms.
The reforms introduced until now harmonized the pension schemes for public and
private salaried workers. In contrast, the rules applied to self-employed workers re-
main different, not only in terms of the eligibility requirements, but also in terms of
social contribution rates. For instance, the contribution rate of salaried workers in the
public and private sectors is equal to 33%, while for self-employed workers it is quite
lower and equals 20%.
Finally, the Amato and the Dini reforms have introduced and improved the legislation
on supplementary funded schemes. Nevertheless, the number of workers enrolled in
private pension funds remains very low.
3. THE MODEL
3.1. General characteristics
The model presented in this paper is an applied overlapping-generations model of
the type Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1987) with endogenous growth and immigration. We
consider 15 age groups, indicated by g = 1, ..., 15, that coexist at each period t. The
first age group considered is 20-24, the last one is 90-94. Each period consists of 5
years and all the variables are supposed to be constant during each period.
For each age group, individuals are characterized by their origin and their profes-
13
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Table 1: Main aspects of the Berlusconi reform (Law 243/2004) and Prodi reform (Law
247/2007)
The Berlusconi reform increased the minimum retirement age as follows:
After 2008, 60 (61 for self-employed workers)
After 2010, 61 (62 for self-employed workers)
After 2014, 62 (63 for self-employed workers)
The Berlusconi reform was replaced in 2007 by a new reform introduced by the Prodi government.
The increase of the minimum retirement age is more gradual:
After 2008:
The minimum retirement age is 58 (59 for self-employed workers)
After 2009:
The minimum retirement age is 59 (60 for self-employed workers)
The sum of the retirement age and the number of years of contributions must be at least 95 (96 for self-employed
workers)
After 2011:
The minimum retirement age is 60 (61 for self-employed workers)
The sum of the retirement age and the number of years of contributions must be at least 96 (97 for self-employed
workers)
After 2013:
The minimum retirement age is 61 (62 for self-employed workers)
The sum of the retirement age and the number of years of contributions must be at least 97 (98 for self-employed
workers)
sional status. Concerning the origin, we distinguish two groups, indicated by z: those
born in Italy (nat) and immigrants (imm).8 Concerning the professional status, we
distinguish two groups, indicated by prof , the salaried workers (prof = empl) and
the self-employed workers (prof = self ).
We assume that the existence of a representative agent of people born in Italy and a
representative agent of immigrants (intra-generation’s heterogeneity), and we assume
that agents have perfect foresight and there is no liquidity constraint.
At the end of each period, people belonging to the last age group (g = 15) die, a
8We assume that immigration only concerns the age group 30-34. This assumption is justified by
the fact that data concerning resident permits (Istat, 2004) are normally distributed with a peak for the
age group 30-34. In any case, the introduction into the model of immigration at different age does not
significantly change the results.
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fraction of people belonging to the other classes dies, and a new generation enters the
active population.
Individuals maximize an intertemporal utility function subject to an intertemporal
budget constraint. Immigrants and people born in Italy have the same structure of
preferences. They decide the intertemporal profile of consumption and leisure as
well as the value of the voluntary bequests that will be left at the end of the last
period of life. On the other hand, only people born in Italy decide the fraction of
time to devote to studying. This decision allows the individual to constitute a stock
of human capital that affects his/her productivity level and then his/her future earning
profile. We introduce an endogenous growth mechanism à la Lucas (1988) where the
productivity growth rate is related to the average level of knowledge present in the
economy.
Intra-generation’s heterogeneity is given by the assumption that immigrants differ
from people born in Italy by a lower level of productivity and that they enter Italy with
no capital. On the other hand, the children of immigrants are considered identical to
the children of people born in Italy. Consequently, they decide the fraction of time to
devote to studying and they display the same productivity as the children of natives.
People who die in the last period of life (95 years old) decide to leave bequests to the
other generations, on the basis of the maximization of their utility function. These
voluntary bequests are uniformly distributed among the other generations. On the
other hand, the presence of involuntary bequests is avoided by introducing an insur-
ance mechanism à la Yaari (1965).
Concerning the production side of the model, in our economy, only one good is pro-
duced by using labor and capital in order to maximize profits and given the following
Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yt = Kαt · L1−αt (1)
where Yt represents the production level of the period, Kt the physical capital de-
mand, and Lt the per unit of effective labor demand. Labor and capital markets are
assumed to be perfectly competitive. This implies that real wages and real interest
rates adjust to equilibrate aggregate demand and aggregate supply.
Aggregate capital supply depends on the individual’s capital accumulation, while ag-
gregate labor supply depends on the demographic evolution and on the individual’s
labor market choices. Labor is supplied by salaried workers and self-employed work-
ers aged between 20 and 64. Labor supply is endogenous for people aged between
20 and 54. In particular, people belonging to the first age group (20-24 years old)
decide the fraction of time to devote to the accumulation of human capital and to
work. The following age groups, until the class 50-54, decide the fraction of time to
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devote to working and to leisure. With regard to the two last age groups who work
(55-59 and 60-64), the fraction of people who work is exogenously fixed, according
to the 2005 data. This permits us to simulate the impact of an exogenous increase in
the retirement age.
The distinction between (private and public) salaried workers and self-employed is
introduced in the model because the social contribution rates, the computation rule
of pension benefits and the eligibility criteria are different. Thus, it is important to
distinguish individuals according to their professional status in order to model the
pension system accurately. However, we do not explicitly model the choice of the
professional status, and we simply assume that the proportion of salaried workers
and self-employed workers is the same for each group and remains constant over
time.
In the next paragraphs, we describe in more detail the demographic aspects of the
model (i.e. the procedure adopted in order to reproduce the demographic projections
by selecting the fertility rates, the survival probabilities and the immigration flows),
the generations’ behavior and the government budget, focusing in particular on the
pension system.
3.2. The demographic evolution
The first step of our modeling effort is to reproduce the demographic projections
presented by Istat (2006) for the period 1950-2050. In particular, since only people
aged 20 and more are taken into account in the model,9 our objective is to reproduce
the demographic evolution of the population aged 20 and more, and in particular the
old-age dependency ratio, i.e. the ratio between people aged 65 and more and people
between 20 and 64, the structure of the population, i.e. the ratio between the number
of people belonging to a specific age group and the total population, and the total
population aged more than 20.
For the first nine age groups we used the survival rates presented by Istat (2006),
while the survival probabilities for the other age groups and the fertility rates have
been calibrated in order to reproduce the Italian demographic evolution. In particular,
following Istat (2007), immigrants’ fertility rates are supposed to be twice those of
natives. We assume that the fertility rates of the second-generation immigrants are
identical of those of natives.10 Given the lack of data, we also assume that the survival
rates are identical for the people born in Italy and immigrants. We adopt migratory
9People under 20 are supposed completely dependent of their family.
10Mayer and Riphahn (1999) estimated that the fertility rates of immigrants tend to converge to the
fertility rates of the natives.
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flows of 150000 individuals per year since 1990, following Istat’s assumptions.
The quality of the calibration of demographic variables to Istat’s projections is sum-
marized in the following figures where we report the old-age dependency ratio, the
total population aged more than aged 20 and more and the weight of the different age
classes in the total population. We can see that the quality of the fit is high.
Figure 3: Old-age dependency ratio
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Figure 5: 20-34 / >20
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Figure 6: 35-49 / >20
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Real Estimated
Figure 7: 50-64 / >20
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Real Estimated
Figure 8: >65 / >20
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Real Estimated
17
CEPII, Working Paper No 2008 – 25
3.3. The generations
3.3.1. Intertemporal preferences
Natives (z = nat) and immigrants (z = imm) have the same structure of prefer-
ences. The expected lifetime utility for the generation of origin z that becomes active
in t depends on the consumption profile, on the leisure profile and on the bequests
left at the end of the last period of life, according to the following relation:
U zt =
∑
g
Ωg,t+g−1 · Γg · (2)

[
czg,t+g−1
]βzCg · [∆ · (1− lzg,t+g−1)]βzLg · [beqzg,t+g−1]βzBg
1− 1γ

1− 1
γ
where 1 ≤ g ≤ 15 for natives and 3 ≤ g ≤ 15 for immigrants since we assume that
they enter Italy aged 30-34.
The following notations have been used:
czg,t is the consumption of individuals of origin z and belonging to the age group
g; lzg,t represents the fraction of time devoted to working;
11 beqz15,t is the voluntary
bequests left at 95 years old.
Γg is the actualization factor (Γg =
∏g
s=1
1
1+ρs
, where ρg is the intertemporal pref-
erence rate for an individual belonging to the age class g); ∆ stands for the number
of years that constitute one period (5 years); Ωg,t is the probability that an individual
who belongs to the age group g is alive in t; γ is the intertemporal elasticity, while
the intra-temporal elasticity is assumed to be equal to 1.
βzCg , β
z
Lg
and βzBg measure respectively the intensity of the preference for consump-
tion, for leisure and for bequests. In particular:
βzCg = 1 , β
z
Lg
= 0 , βzBg = 0 if g = 1
βzCg = 1− βzLEISg , βzLg > 0 , βzBg = 0 if 2 ≤ g ≤ 7
βzCg = 1 , β
z
Lg
= 0 , βzBg = 0 if 8 ≤ g ≤ 14
βzCg = 1− βzBEQg , βzLg = 0 , βzBg > 0 if g = 15
3.3.2. Individual productivity and human capital accumulation
The labor income for an individual of origin z, belonging to the age group g and
working in the professional activity prof , is given by the product between the wage
111− lzg,t represents the fraction of time devoted to leisure with g > 1, whereas for the first age group
(g = 1) it represents the fraction of time devoted to studying.
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per unit of effective labor (wt) and the total productivity level specific to the individ-
ual (Az,profg,t ).
In particular, the wage per unit of effective labor, identical for each individual, is
endogenously determined in order to guarantee the labor market equilibrium, see
Equation (24).
The individual productivity level depends on five elements:
i) The individual’s age, measured byEPg. This component exerts a standard quadratic
form:
EPg = θ0 + θ1g + θ2g2 (3)
with 1 ≤ g ≤ 9 since only people in the first nine age groups work, and
θ1 > 0, θ2 < 0.
ii) The individual’s education level, measured by HCzg,t. The stock of human capital
accumulated by natives (z = nat) belonging to the first age group (20-24)
depends on the number of years devoted to studying according to the following
increasing and concave relation:
HCnat1,t =
[
∆ ·
(
1− lnat1,t
)]αHC
(4)
where
[
∆ ·
(
1− lnat1,t
)]
is the number of years devoted to studying and αHC >
0. Afterwards, the individual human capital depreciates at a constant rate δHC :
HCnatg,t = (1− δHC) ·HCnatg−1,t−1 (5)
Given that immigrants enter Italy aged 30-34, they are not concerned by the
choice of the education level, then their human capital stock (HCimmg,t ) is con-
sidered exogenous.
iii) An externality component, measured byHt, related to the average level of knowl-
edge present in the economy, indicated by Ht. This latter component is given
by the weighted average of the stocks of human capital of each age class that
works at the same period: Ht =
∑
z
∑
g
HCzg,t·lzg,t·Popzg,t∑
z
∑
g
lzg,t·Popzg,t
. Moreover, we in-
troduce an endogenous growth mechanism à la Lucas (1988) in the follow-
ing way: the productivity growth rate (gHt), which represents the steady state
growth rate of variables in per capita terms, is endogenous and supposed to be
related to the average level of knowledge as follows:
gHt =
Ht+1 −Ht
Ht
= χ ·H
1
αHC
t (6)
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where χ > 0. As no individual could influence, by his/her decision to study,
the value of this index, this stands as a positive externality.
iv) The individual’s professional status, measured by Ψprof , that represents the (ex-
ogenous and constant) difference in productivity between salaried workers and
self-employed workers.
v) The individual’s origins, measured by θz , that represents the difference in produc-
tivity between natives and immigrants in the base year.12
Finally, the individual’s total productivity (Az,profg,t ) is given by the product of the
previous elements:
Az,profg,t = EPg ·HCzg,t ·Ht ·Ψprof · θz (7)
Given that the productivity difference between salaried workers and self-employed
workers is assumed to be constant and that the individual choice between these two
options is not modeled, we can define an average productivity, indicated byAzg,t. This
element is computed as the average of Az,profg,t weighted by the proportion (assumed
to be the same for each age group and constant over time) of salaried workers and
self-employed workers.
3.3.3. Pension benefits
Pension benefits are computed according to the rules introduced by the reforms Am-
ato and Dini. In our analysis, we consider three types of pensions, indicated by type:
direct pensions (type = dir), disability benefits (type = dis) and pensions to sur-
vivors (type = surv). These pensions are paid to the retirees according to their
professional status prof , i.e. to salaried workers (prof = empl) and self-employed
workers (prof = self ). We begin with the description of the computation of direct
pensions.
The value of direct pension benefits is computed in the model by applying the earning
based method for the pensions paid until 2015, the pro-rata method for the pensions
paid between 2015 and 2030, and the contribution based method for the pensions
paid from 2030.
First of all, it is necessary to distinguish pension benefits paid to individuals belong-
ing to the age group 55-59 and to individuals belonging to the age group 60-64. For
12However, note that the difference in productivity between natives and immigrants may change over
time since the human capital stock of natives is endogenous.
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the latter, only a fraction of people retires between 60 and 64 while the complement
fraction retires during the previous period (55-59).
For the retirees belonging to the age group 55-59 (g = 8), pension benefits are com-
puted in the following way:
- Earning based method (t < 2015): the annual pension benefit is computed on the
basis of the average income earned during the last 10 years (the last two periods
in our model) for salaried workers (prof = empl) and during the last 15 years
(the last three periods in our model) for self-employed workers (prof = self ):
Pensz,empl8,dir,t = n
z
8 · 0.02 ·
∑1
s=0wt−s ·Az,empl8−s,empl,t−s
2
(8)
Pensz,self8,dir,t = n
z
8 · 0.02 ·
∑2
s=0wt−s ·Az,empl8−s,empl,t−s
3
(9)
The replacement ratio is then proportional to the number of years worked by
class 55-59, indicated by nz8.
- Contribution based method (t > 2030): the annual pension benefit for each profes-
sional status (salaried workers and self-employed) is computed by multiplying
the transformation coefficient β8 by the value of the contributions paid during
the whole working life and capitalized on the basis of the average GDP growth
rate (ggdpt):
Pensz,prof8,dir,t = β8 ·
∑
g
τ c · wt+g−8 ·Az,profg,t+g−8 ·
t∏
s=t+g−8
(1 + ggdps)
 (10)
with 1 ≤ g ≤ 8 for people born in Italy and 3 ≤ g ≤ 8 for immigrants.
- Pro-rata method (2015 ≤ t ≤ 2030): the annual pension benefit is equal to a
weighted average between the pension benefit computed with the earning based
method and the contribution based method, where the weight depends on the
number of years worked before and after 1995.
For the retirees belonging to the age group 60-64 (g = 9), we have to consider that
only a fraction (noted λ) of these individuals retires between 60 and 64 and that the
complement fraction (1− λ) retires during the previous period (55-59). On average,
the pension benefit obtained by the representative individual aged 60-64 is computed
in the following way:
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- Earning based method (t < 2015): the annual pension benefit for salaried workers
and self-employed workers is given by:
Pensz,empl9,dir,t = λ · nz9 · 0.02 ·
∑1
s=0wt−s ·Az,empl9−s,empl,t−s
2
+ (1− λ) · Pensz,empl8,empl,t−1 (11)
Pensz,self9,dir,t = λ · nz9 · 0.02 ·
∑2
s=0wt−s ·Az,empl9−s,empl,t−s
3
+ (1− λ) · Pensz,self8,t−1 (12)
- Contribution based method (t > 2030):
Pensz,prof9,dir,t = λ · β9 ·
∑
g
τ c · wt+g−9 ·Az,profg,t+g−9 ·
t∏
s=t+g−9
(1 + ggdps)
+ (1− λ) · Pensz,prof8,,t−1 (13)
- Pro-rata method (2015 ≤ t ≤ 2030): with regard to the fraction λ of individuals
who retire between 60 and 64, pension benefits are given by a weighted average
between the pension benefits computed with the earning based method and the
contribution based method, whereas the fraction (1− λ) of workers who retire
in the previous period, receives Pensz,prof8,dir,t−1.
Concerning the indexation of pension benefits, from 1992 onwards, pension benefits
are not indexed to real wages, but to prices, and therefore remain constant over time
in real terms:
Pensz,profg,dir,t+g−9 = Pens
z,prof
9,dir,t (14)
with 10 ≤ g ≤ 15.
The transformation coefficients β are defined by Law 335/1995 and vary according
to the retirement age of the individual: they lie between 4.72% for people who retire
at 57 and 6.136% for people who retire at 65. According to Law 335/1995, these
coefficients must be updated every 10 years according to the evolution of the life
expectancy. In the model, the transformation coefficients used in the model for the
age groups 55-59 and 60-64 (respectively β8 and β9) are endogenously determined
by considering the average retirement age within the two age groups.
Concerning disability benefits and pension benefits to survivors we assume that they
are proportional to the direct pension benefits. Disability benefits and pension bene-
fits to survivors are then computed in the model by applying a coefficient that permits
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to reproduce the data concerning the average pension benefits (see below Tables 2 and
3 in Paragraph 4.1).
3.3.4. Intertemporal budget constraint
Each agent maximizes his/her intertemporal utility function conditional on his/her
intertemporal budget constraint. For people who live until the last age group (95
years old), the end of life wealth is left as voluntary bequests. In the case of pre-
mature death, in order to avoid the presence of involuntary bequests, we assume the
existence of a life insurance sector which offers actuarially fair annuities, where the
actuarial rate of interest exceeds the market rate of interest by the conditional mortal-
ity probability (Yaari, 1965).
The present value of the final wealth is given by the difference between the present
value of future incomes and the present value of future consumption. In particular,
incomes are given by net labor incomes, net pensions and inheritances.
Thus, for each period, the budget constraint for an individual of origin z and belong-
ing to the age group g is as follows:
wealthzg+1,t+1 = [1 + (1− τt) · rt] · wealthzg,t + (15)
(1− τt − τ c) · wt ·Azg,t · lzg,t +∑
prof
∑
type
(1− τt) · Pensz,profg,type,t · npensprofg,type,t +
(1− ωg,t) · wealthzg+1,t+1
+inhzg · beqz15,t ·
Popz15,t
Popzg,t
−czg,t
where: wealthzg,t is the wealth owned by individuals of origin z and belonging to
the age group g; rt is the interest rate; τt is the income tax rate; τ c is the social con-
tribution rate (computed as the average between the social contribution rate applied
to salaried workers and to self-employed workers); npensprofg,type,t is the fraction of
individuals belonging to the age group g who receive pension benefits, according to
the professional status and the type of benefits;13 ωg,t is the survival probability for
an individual belonging to the class age g in t; inhzg is a parameter computed in order
to distribute the voluntary bequests uniformly among the generations.
13The parameter npensg,prof,type,t is related to lzg,t . In fact lzg,t represents not only the fraction
of time devoted to working by the representative agent, but can also be interpreted as the fraction of
individuals that belong to an age class who work.
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3.3.5. Optimal individual choices
By maximizing utility, each individual chooses simultaneously the fraction of time
to devote to schooling, his/her intertemporal profile of leisure and consumption, and
the amount of bequest to leave if he/she survives until 95 years old.
The first order conditions are the following:
i) Decision of studying, which only concerns natives (z = nat) belonging to the age
group g = 1:
(1− τt − τ c) ·
wt ·Anat1,t
∆
(16)
=
9∑
g=1
Rt+g−1 · (1− τt+g−1 − τ c) ·
wt+g−1 · lnatg,t+g−1 ·
∂Anatg,t+g−1
∂
[
∆ ·
(
1− lnat1,t
)] · Ωg,t+g−1
where τt is the income tax rate, τ c is the social contribution rate (computed as the
average between the social contribution rate applied to salaried workers and to self-
employed workers), wt is the wage rate and Rt represents the discount factor, with
Rt+g−1 =
∏t+g−1
s=t+1
(
1
1+(1−τt)·rt
)
where rt is the interest rate.
This condition means that if an individual decides at t to study one more year,14 he
gives up to one year of wage (the LHS) that, at the optimum, must be equal to the
expected present value of all additional incomes earned thanks to the increase in the
productivity related to human capital (the RHS).
Ceteris paribus, individuals decide to devote more time to human capital accumula-
tion when future wages are expected to increase or future interest rates are expected
to decrease, and when the survival probabilities increase.
ii) Decision concerning the leisure (for age groups 2 ≤ g ≤ 7):
1− lzg,t =
βzLg
1− βzLg
· c
z
g,t
(1− τt − τ c) · wt ·Azg,t
(17)
Ceteris paribus, an increase in the net wage induces an increase in the individual’s
labor supply.
14Note that ∆ ·
(
1 − lnat1,t
)
indicates the number of years devoted to studying by people belonging to
the first age group.
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iii) Intertemporal profile of consumption:
czg+1,t+1
czg,t
=
[
1 + (1− τt+1) · rt+1
1 + ρg+1
]γ
·
(
1− βzLg+1
1− βzLg
)γ
·

(
βzLg
1−βzLg
)βzLg
(
βzLg+1
1−βzLg+1
)βzLg+1

1−γ
·

[
(1− τt+1 − τ c) ·Azg+1,t+1 · wt+1
]βzLg+1
[(1− τt − τ c) ·Ag,t · wt]β
z
Lg

1−γ
(18)
iv) Voluntary bequests (for the age group g = 15):
beqz15,t+14 =
βzB15
1− βzB15
· cz15,t+14 (19)
The individual’s optimal bequests are then proportional to his/her consumption in the
last period of life.
3.4. The government
3.4.1. The pension system
The Italian pension system is a Pay-As-You-Go system in which workers pay social
security contributions (33% of wages for the public and private salaried workers and
20% of wages for self-employed workers) and the pension benefits are computed
according to the rules introduced by the reforms Amato and Dini as described in
Paragraph 3.3.3.
The deficit of the pension system is computed as follows:
DefPSt =
∑
z
∑
g
∑
prof
∑
type
Popzg,t · (1− τt) · Pensz,profg,type,t · npensprofg,type,t −∑
z
∑
g
Popzg,t · τ c · wt ·Azg,t · lzg,t (20)
3.4.2. Public expenditures and government savings
In the model, we consider three types of public expenditures: expenditures on the
education of young people aged from 5 to 24, health care expenditures, and others
public expenditures (public defence, public administration...).
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Public spending on education (Gedut) is assumed to be proportional to the number
of people attending school, while health care expenditure (Gmedt) is proportional to
the number of people aged more than 60.
We also assume that the average expenditure per student and the average health ex-
penditure per old person vary over time according to the evolution of the GDP.
Concerning the other public expenditures (Gt), we assume they grow at the same rate
as the GDP.
Government savings (Sgovt) are given by the difference between revenues (taxes on
labor and capital incomes and on pension benefits) and expenditures (on education,
on health and public expenditures, the deficit of the pension system, and the interests
paid on the public debt):
Sgovt =
∑
z
∑
g
Popzg,t · τt ·
(
wt ·Azg,t · lzg,t + rt · wealthzg,t
)
(21)
+
∑
z
∑
g
Popzg,t · τt ·
∑
prof
∑
type
Pensz,profg,type,t · npensprofg,type,t
− (Gedut +Gmedt +Gt +DefPSt + rt ·Bt)
We fix the ratio of the national debt (Bt) to GDP and we determine, for each period,
the income tax rate (τt) that permits to respect this budget constraint.
3.5. Equilibrium conditions
There are three markets in the model: the market of goods and services, the capital
market and the labor market. These markets are supposed to be perfectly competitive,
so prices adjust in order to guarantee the market clearing. The equilibrium conditions
are the following:
Yt =
∑
z
∑
g
Popzg,t · czg,t +Gedut +Gmedt +Gt + It (22)
Kt +Bt =
∑
z
∑
g
Popzg,t · wealthzg,t (23)
Lt =
∑
z
∑
g
Popzg,t · lzg,t ·Azg,t (24)
Equation (22) represents the equilibrium in the market of goods and services: produc-
tion must be equal to aggregate demand, given by the private and public consumption
and by the investments.
Equation (23) represents the equilibrium in the capital market. In our model we con-
sider two assets, physical capital and government bonds, that are supposed perfectly
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substitutes, so their remuneration must be the same. The equilibrium condition is
that assets demanded by firms and government (LHS) should equal the aggregate
household wealth, where the individual wealth wealthzg,t is defined in Equation (15).
Equation (24) indicates that the total labor supply expressed in per unit of effective
labor (RHS) is entirely used in the production activity.
One of previous equations is redundant by the Walras’ Law and we consider the
domestic good as the numeraire.
3.6. Dynamics of the economy
The dynamics of the economy concern the evolution of labor supply, capital, govern-
ment bonds and productivity. The evolution of labor supply depends on the individual
labor choices (i.e. the choices concerning the fraction of time devoted to schooling
and leisure) and on the demographic evolution (i.e. the evolution of fertility rates, sur-
vival probabilities and immigration flows). The labor productivity evolves over time
according to the endogenous growth mechanism described in Equation (6). Finally,
the evolution of the capital stock depends on investments and on capital depreciation,
while public debt depends on government savings, as follows:
Kt+1 = Kt · (1− δ) + It (25)
Bt+1 = Bt − Sgovt (26)
4. CALIBRATION OF THE MODEL
The aim of our calibration is two-fold: reproduce the 2005 Italian macroeconomic
data (in particular, the value of the GDP, the ratio between aggregate consumption
and GDP, the ratio between investments and GDP, and the ratio between public ex-
penditures and GDP) and replicate the most important ingredients of the pension
system (the ratio of the number of retirees to the number of workers, the average pen-
sion benefits for each type of pensions, and the ratio of the total pension expenditure
to GDP).
4.1. The calibration of the pension system
Given that our objective is to evaluate the impacts of pension reforms in the context of
population ageing, we focus on the IVS pensions (including old-age direct pensions,
pensions to survivors and disability benefits). IVS pensions account for 13.64% of
GDP in 2005 (Istat, 2007).
However, in our analysis, we do not consider:
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- IVS pensions paid by private institutions that account for 0.16% of GDP;
- Supplementary pensions15 that account for 0.33% of GDP;
- Pensions paid to people aged less than 55.
Then, the pension system analyzed in our paper accounts for 12.89% of GDP. In
particular, pensions to public and private salaried workers account for 10.50% of
GDP, while pensions to self-employed account for 2.39%. Direct pensions account
for 9.87% of GDP, disability benefits for 0.88% and pensions to survivors for 2.14%.
Tables 2 and 3 present the main characteristics of the pension system analyzed in
our paper. Data show that, concerning direct pensions, the average pension benefits
earned by self-employed are 40% lower than those earned by salaried workers. This
relevant difference is not related to a different calculation rule of pensions: in fact,
in 2005, the gross replacement ratio was very similar for salaried workers and self-
employed.16 The difference in the average pension benefits is then related to an
important difference in remuneration between salaried workers and self-employed
workers, represented in our model by the coefficient Ψprof in Equation (7).
Table 2: Pensions paid to the employees. Source: Istat, 2007
Direct Pensions Disability Pensions Indirect Pensions
N. of pensions Expenditure Average N. of pensions Expenditure Average N. of pensions Expenditure Average
(000 euros) pension (000 euros) pension (000 euros) pension
55-59 790 716 15 507 566 19 612 90 062 824 026 9 150 155 738 1 239 611 7 960
60-64 1 274 702 21 885 456 17 169 91 203 754 850 8 277 213 237 1 743 589 8 177
65-69 1 687 695 25 292 352 14 986 111 556 831 191 7 451 376 179 3 040 756 8 083
70-74 1 533 347 20 186 641 13 165 171 320 1 221 380 7 129 549 334 4 318 436 7 861
75-79 1 246 960 15 635 855 12 539 261 016 1 824 525 6 990 715 720 5 502 937 7 689
80-84 854 241 10 177 760 11 914 278 749 1 865 127 6 691 727 666 5 460 919 7 505
85-89 326 457 3 691 577 11 308 136 930 875 907 6 397 378 442 2 796 284 7 389
>90 202 327 2 092 297 10 341 88 636 538 449 6 075 296 497 2 150 206 7 252
Total 7 916 445 114 469 504 14 460 1 229 472 8 735 454 7 105 3 412 813 26 252 738 7 692
15Supplementary pension systems, recently introduced in the Italian system, are mostly funded and
voluntary. They include closed-end funds and collective pension funds.
16In 2005, according to Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (2006), in the case of an individual aged 63
with 35 years of contributions, the gross replacement ratio was 70.7% for the employees and 69% for
the self-employed. In the case of an individual with 40 years of contributions, the gross replacement
ratio was 80.7% for the employees and 78.7% for the self-employed.
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Table 3: Pensions paid to self-employed. Source: Istat, 2007
Direct Pensions Disability Pensions Indirect Pensions
N. of pensions Expenditure Average N. of pensions Expenditure Average N. of pensions Expenditure Average
(000 euros) pension (000 euros) pension (000 euros) pension
55-59 178 373 2 200 736 12 338 41 572 305 540 7 350 58 627 322 835 5 507
60-64 675 952 6 538 672 9 673 39 154 263 017 6 718 81 210 437 748 5 390
65-69 862 610 7 610 403 8 823 43 497 257 300 5 915 125 291 645 156 5 149
70-74 612 617 4 711 729 7 691 68 782 386 936 5 626 150 438 715 833 4 758
75-79 417 259 2 882 303 6 908 120 743 651 327 5 394 176 310 762 964 4 327
80-84 224 383 1 443 424 6 433 166 721 880 195 5 279 181 448 714 331 3 937
85-89 65 558 389 712 5 945 105 712 552 372 5 225 99 543 361 353 3 630
>90 41 348 228 313 5 522 90 814 469 756 5 173 90 442 302 753 3 347
Total 3 078 100 26 005 293 8 448 676 995 3 766 444 5 563 963 309 4 262 972 4 425
4.2. The calibration of the macroeconomy
The model is calibrated conditional to the demographic change, to an endogenous an-
nual productivity growth rate of about 1.5%, and to the pension reforms introduced
in the Nineties. In particular, the demographic shock is introduced through a combi-
nation of changes in fertility rates, mortality rates and immigration flows, determined
to reproduce as closely as possible demographic projections presented by Istat as
described in Paragraph 3.2.
Our model starts in 1950. The calibration is done in a way we reproduce the 2005
observed data.17 In Table 4 we report the main values of the parameters used in
the model, whereas in Tables 5, 6 and 7 we report the values for some endogenous
variables produced by the model that we compare to the 2005 data.
In particular, the parameter that measures the intensity of the preference for bequests
(βzB ) and the intertemporal preference factor (Γg) used in the utility function (Equa-
tion (2)) are calibrated to reproduce a wealth profile of the different age groups com-
patible with the 2005 data.18 The parameters that measure the intensity of the pref-
erence for leisure (βzLg ) in Equation (2) are calibrated to replicate the employment
rates of the different age groups in 2005. These parameters are allowed to change
over time in order to take into account the increase in women labor participation in
the next decades that mainly depends on cultural factors.
Concerning the individual productivity, the parameters θ0, θ1 and θ2 in Equation (3)
are calibrated to replicate the earnings profile used by Fougère and Mérette (1999)
that were set to produce a maximum at the age of 52. The parameter αHC in Equation
(4) is calibrated to replicate in 2005 the fraction of young people (20-24 years old)
17In other words, we determine the stocks in 1950 and the intertemporal prices between 1950 and
2005 in order to reproduce the 2005 real data.
18Most of the OLG models consider an intertemporal preference rate identical for each age groups
and no bequest motive, as in Miles (1999). Therefore, in this case, old people present a very negative
value of the propensity to save, that is not consistent to real data.
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who study. The parameter χ in Equation (6) is calibrated to obtain a productivity
growth rate in 2005 close to 1.5%. The parameter θz is chosen such that the total
productivity of immigrants is lower by 13% of the total productivity of natives.19
Both the calibration and simulations were made by using numerical algorithms pro-
vided by GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling System).
Table 4: Some parameters used in the model
Households
θ0 0.675
Productivity related to the age θ1 0.350
θ2 -0.025
Productivity related to the education αHC 0.339
Productivity related to the average level of knowledge χ 0.089
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ 0.75
βL2 0.597
βL3 0.713
Index of preference for leisure βL4 0.744
βL5 0.754
βL6 0.761
βL7 0.735
Index of preference for bequests βB 1.098
Firms
Annual depreciation rate of physical capital δ 5 %
Capital remuneration in the added value α 0.412
Government
Contribution rate applied to salaried workers 33 %
Contribution rate applied to self-employed workers 20 %
Average contribution rate τ c 23.3 %
Public debt / GDP 106.4 %
Total public expenditure / GDP 20.4 %
19Storesletten (2000) finds, for the United States, that the productivity of people who immigrate at
37 years old is lower by 13% with respect to that of natives. In our case, this assumption implies that
immigrants have a level of productivity related to education lower by 13% compared to natives. In fact,
we can suppose that an immigrant and a native, with the same age, have the same productivity related
to the experience (EP ) and that they profit in the same way of the knowledge present in the economy
(H). By considering Equation (4), this assumption implies that immigrants have a stock of human
capital lower by 10% relatively to natives.
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Table 5: Variables concerning the macroeconomy, year 2005
Simulated value Real data
GDP (in milliards of euros) 1423.022 1423.049
Consumption / GDP 59.00 % 58.63 %
Investments / GDP 20.50 % 20.42 %
Gedu / GDP 4.58 % 4.62 %
Gmed / GDP 6.95 % 6.93 %
G / GDP 8.96 % 8.87 %
Income tax rate 14.8 %
K / GDP 2.65
Table 6: Variables concerning the labor market, year 2005
Simulated value Real data
20-24 41.16 % 41.11 %
25-29 63.24 % 63.26 %
30-34 74.06 % 74.36 %
35-39 76.01 % 76.22 %
Employment rates 40-44 76.23 % 76.40 %
45-49 74.03 % 74.06 %
50-54 66.71 % 66.87 %
55-59 43.07 % 43.07 %
60-64 17.99 % 17.99 %
National employment rate 61.29 % 61.48 %
Employment rate for natives 60.76 % 61.12 %
Employment rate for immigrants 69.85 % 70.05 %
Retirees / Workers 0.786
Table 7: Pension system expenditures with respect to GDP, year 2005
Simulated value Real data
All pensions 12.97 % 12.89 %
direct pensions 8.09 % 8.04 %
Salaried workers disability benefits 0.61 % 0.61 %
indirect pensions 1.82 % 1.84 %
direct pensions 1.89 % 1.83 %
Self-employed workers disability benefits 0.26 % 0.26 %
indirect pensions 0.30 % 0.30 %
31
CEPII, Working Paper No 2008 – 25
5. EFFECTS OF THE RECENT REFORMS: BERLUSCONI AND PRODI
REFORMS
We now use the model to simulate and compare the pension reforms recently intro-
duced: the Berlusconi reform (2004) and the Prodi reform (2007). Whereas with
the Dini reform workers can decide to retire between 57 and 65, the two new re-
forms increase the minimum retirement age, as described in Table 1 in Paragraph 2.
These two reforms are compared with our base scenario in which the increase in the
retirement age is not taken into account.
5.1. Macroeconomic impacts
First of all, the increase in the retirement age will have a direct impact on the labor
supply. Figures 9 and 10 show that, with respect to the base case, the increase in the
retirement age induces an increase in the employment rate, i.e. the ratio between the
number of workers and the working age population (20-64), and a reduction in the
ratio of the number of retirees to the number of workers.20
In the three cases, the population ageing phenomenon boosts the capital per unit of
effective labor that raises the equilibrium per unit of effective wage and reduces the
equilibrium (net of tax) interest rate (Figures 11 and 12). The fact that the two reforms
induce an increase in the labor supply explains why wages are lower and the interest
rate is higher with respect to the base case.
The increase of survival probabilities and future wages and the decrease of future
interest rates affect positively the optimal time devoted to studying by young people
(Figure 13). Moreover, with respect to the base scenario, the increase in the retire-
ment age and then in the overall lifetime spent working, induce young people to
devote additional time to human capital accumulation. The productivity growth rate,
that depends on the weighted average of the productivity levels of each age group, in-
creases over time (Figure 14): from 1.5% in 2005 to 1.7% in 2055. However, a more
important investment in human capital, with respect to the base case, is not sufficient
to induce a greater pace of the productivity growth rate. This is related to the fact
that the two reforms induce an increase of the weight of people aged 55-64 (with a
lower human capital stock given the hypothesis of the depreciation of human capital)
which reduces the average level of human capital.
20Note that, from an economic point of view, the ratio of the retirees to the workers speaks more than
the old-age dependency ratio, since it also takes into account the evolution of the employment ratio.
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Figure 9: Employment rate
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Figure 10: # retirees / # workers
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Figure 11: Wage, per unit of effective labor
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Figure 12: Interest rate
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Figure 13: Time devoted to schooling
1.00
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1996-00 2001-05 2006-10 2011-15 2016-20 2021-25 2026-30 2031-35 2036-40 2041-45 2046-50 2051-55
Base Berl Prodi
Figure 14: Productivity growth rate
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The macroeconomic effects, in terms of economic growth, of the increase in retire-
ment age are positive until 2025. Starting from 2025, the difference with respect to
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the base scenario becomes insignificant.
In the base scenario, the ratio of investments to GDP (Figure 15) increases until 2020
and then it drastically decreases. The initial increase is related to the Dini reform
that will significantly reduce pension benefits with the application of the contribution
based method, and to the Amato reform that introduced an indexation mechanism
of pension benefits to prices. It is well known that a reduction in the generosity of
the pension system stimulates national savings by modifying the individual behavior
in terms of consumption and saving. However, after some periods, investments over
GDP decrease because the positive effect on private savings is more than compen-
sated by the high deficits generated by the pension system.
With respect to the base scenario, the increase in the retirement age has a negative
impact on the ratio of investments to GDP. With the reform, in fact, individuals expect
to work more and earn more in the future (both in terms of labor incomes and pen-
sion benefits) so they can increase their consumption levels and reduce their actual
savings.21
The evolution of GDP is mainly affected by the demographic projections. The strong
reduction in the population aged between 20 and 64 implies negative rates of growth
of the number of workers from 2015 to 2055 (Figure 16) and explains the negative
evolution GDP growth (Figure 17) and per capita GDP growth (Figure 18). The
evolution of the investment ratio plays another negative role in the economic growth,
while the increase in the productivity growth rate and the increase in the employment
rates are not sufficient to compensate the previous negative effects.
With respect to the base scenario, the reforms would induce an increase in the growth
rate of the number of workers and consequently of the GDP growth rate and per
capita GDP growth rate until 2025. Afterwards, the economic growth rates are very
similar in the three scenarios.
21The closed-economy assumption is the key to this result. As argued in the introduction, although
Italy is clearly an open economy, the simultaneity of pension reforms around the world yields a fall in
investments.
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Figure 15: Investments / GDP
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Figure 16: Growth rate of the # of workers
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Figure 17: GDP growth rate
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Figure 18: Per capita GDP growth rate
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5.2. Effects of the Berlusconi and Prodi reforms on the pension system
Figures 19 and 20 show the evolution of the pension system in terms of expenditures
and deficits produced. We see that initially the two reforms that increase the retire-
ment age have a significant positive impact on the financial situation of the pension
system with respect to the base scenario, both in terms of the deficit and of the ag-
gregate expenditure, as a ratio to GDP. For example, the Berlusconi reform makes it
possible to reduce the ratio of the deficit to GDP of about 0.7 percentage points in
2015 and 0.3 p.p. in 2030. As could be expected, reduction in the pension deficits
with the Prodi reform is less important in the short run than with the Berlusconi re-
form. The reduction is 0.5 p.p. in 2015, 0.2 p.p. in 2030 with respect to the base
scenario.
However, in the long run, the increase in the retirement age becomes completely
ineffective. In year 2035, the two reforms display the same ratio of the pension
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system deficit to GDP as in the base scenario, and afterwards, this ratio becomes
more important than in the base case.
Figure 19: Pension system deficit / GDP
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Figure 20: Pension expenditure / GDP
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In order to understand the reason behind the inefficiency of these reforms in the long
run, we have to consider that an increase in the retirement age induces a present
loss (represented by the additional contributions paid and by the foregone pension
benefits) and future gains (represented by the increase in the value of the pension
thereafter). In the early years of the introduction of the reform, the increase in the
retirement age can only have positive effects on the pension system. However, as
time passes, a larger number of individuals receive the increase in pension benefits.
To show this, let us imagine that before the reform each individual retires at 58 and
that the reform increases the retirement age by one year from 2008 onwards. In 2008,
people who are forced to postpone retirement pay one more year of contributions and
loose one year of pension benefits. Their loss represents a net gain for the pension
system since pension benefits do not change for any age groups that year. The next
year, the pension system receives the same increase in contributions but this gain is
now partially compensated by the increase in pension benefits paid to the retirees
who, without the reform, would have retired at 58 in 2008 but, with the reform, retire
at 59 in 2009. In 2010 two age groups benefit from the increase in pensions: people
who, without the reform, would retire at 58 in 2008 and at 58 in 2009 but, with the
reform, are constrained to work one additional year. And so on. So, as time passes
by, the number of individuals who earns a greater level of pension benefits increases
and the increase in the pension expenditure compensates the increase in the social
contributions paid by the workers obliged to work more, and the reform ceases to be
effective.
Another element that makes the reform ineffective in the long run is related to the
contribution based method introduced by the Dini reform in order to penalize early
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retirement. In 2005, as Table 8 and 9 show respectively for salaried workers and
self-employed workers, the rate of return on contributions22 for those who retire at
57 was largely higher than that of individuals who postpone retirement; in contrast,
from 2040 onwards, the difference between the rates of return on contributions is
significantly reduced. This implies that, when the earning based method is applied
and the rate of return on contributions are different according the retirement age, if
an individual works one more year the increase in the value of his/her pension is
less important in the case where the rates of return on contributions are equal for
all individuals. In contrast, with the contribution based method and the presence of
an actuarial link between pension benefits and contributions paid, if an individual
decides to work one more year, the increase in the value of his/her pension is more
relevant. Thus, in every case, the increase in the retirement age causes an increase
in pension benefits, but this increase is more important when the contribution based
method is applied. The fact that starting from 2045 the majority of the retirees receive
a pension computed with the contribution based method represents another element
that influences negatively the evolution of pension system.
Table 8: Rate of return on contributions; native employees; base scenario.
Source: Author’s calculations
Retirement age 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
Years of contributions 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
2001-05 3.20% 3.05% 2.89% 2.73% 2.45% 2.30% 2.14% 1.98% 1.81%
2006-10 3.29% 3.14% 2.98% 2.82% 2.51% 2.36% 2.20% 2.04% 1.86%
2011-15 3.33% 3.18% 3.01% 2.84% 2.52% 2.36% 2.19% 2.01% 1.83%
2016-20 2.90% 2.78% 2.66% 2.53% 2.34% 2.24% 2.13% 2.03% 1.92%
2021-25 2.77% 2.66% 2.56% 2.45% 2.29% 2.21% 2.12% 2.03% 1.93%
2026-30 2.57% 2.49% 2.40% 2.31% 2.20% 2.13% 2.06% 1.98% 1.90%
2031-35 2.21% 2.16% 2.10% 2.05% 2.01% 1.97% 1.92% 1.87% 1.82%
2036-40 2.06% 2.01% 1.97% 1.91% 1.88% 1.85% 1.80% 1.76% 1.71%
2041-45 1.91% 1.88% 1.83% 1.79% 1.76% 1.73% 1.69% 1.64% 1.60%
2046-50 1.80% 1.77% 1.73% 1.69% 1.66% 1.63% 1.59% 1.55% 1.51%
2051-55 1.75% 1.72% 1.68% 1.64% 1.62% 1.59% 1.55% 1.51% 1.47%
22The rate of return on contributions is defined as the rate that equalizes the expected capitalized
value of the contributions paid and the expected present value of the pension benefits earned. Note that
if an individual decides (or is constrained by the law) to work one more year, and assuming that the rate
of return on contributions does not depend on the age of retirement, the increase in pension benefits
must be such that the expected present value of the future increase in pension benefits is equal to the
sum of the additional contributions paid and the pension benefits given up.
37
CEPII, Working Paper No 2008 – 25
Table 9: Rate of return on contributions; native self-employed; base scenario.
Source: Author’s calculations
Retirement age 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
Years of contributions 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
2001-05 4.92% 4.75% 4.57% 4.38% 4.09% 3.93% 3.75% 3.57% 3.38%
2006-10 5.02% 4.85% 4.66% 4.47% 4.16% 4.00% 3.82% 3.63% 3.44%
2011-15 5.07% 4.89% 4.71% 4.51% 4.17% 4.00% 3.81% 3.62% 3.41%
2016-20 3.90% 3.74% 3.58% 3.41% 3.17% 3.03% 2.89% 2.75% 2.61%
2021-25 3.52% 3.38% 3.24% 3.10% 2.90% 2.79% 2.67% 2.55% 2.43%
2026-30 3.05% 2.94% 2.83% 2.72% 2.58% 2.49% 2.40% 2.30% 2.21%
2031-35 2.21% 2.16% 2.10% 2.05% 2.01% 1.97% 1.92% 1.87% 1.82%
2036-40 2.06% 2.01% 1.97% 1.91% 1.88% 1.85% 1.80% 1.76% 1.71%
2041-45 1.91% 1.88% 1.83% 1.79% 1.76% 1.73% 1.69% 1.64% 1.60%
2046-50 1.80% 1.77% 1.73% 1.69% 1.66% 1.63% 1.59% 1.55% 1.51%
2051-55 1.75% 1.72% 1.68% 1.64% 1.62% 1.59% 1.55% 1.51% 1.47%
Table 10: Gross replacement ratio; native employees; base scenario.
Source: Author’s calculations
Retirement age 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
Years of contributions 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
2001-05 70.3% 72.7% 75.0% 77.4% 77.8% 80.0% 82.3% 84.5% 86.8%
2006-10 70.1% 72.5% 74.9% 77.3% 77.5% 79.8% 82.2% 84.5% 86.9%
2011-15 70.2% 72.7% 75.2% 77.6% 77.7% 80.0% 82.4% 84.8% 87.3%
2016-20 62.8% 65.6% 68.6% 71.7% 74.5% 78.1% 81.9% 86.0% 90.4%
2021-25 59.8% 62.8% 65.9% 69.3% 72.7% 76.5% 80.7% 85.1% 89.9%
2026-30 56.1% 59.2% 62.4% 65.9% 70.0% 74.0% 78.4% 83.0% 88.1%
2031-35 51.9% 55.3% 58.8% 62.6% 67.8% 72.3% 77.0% 82.1% 87.7%
2036-40 48.9% 52.1% 55.4% 59.0% 65.7% 70.1% 74.7% 79.7% 85.1%
2041-45 47.6% 50.7% 54.0% 57.6% 62.6% 66.8% 71.2% 75.9% 81.1%
2046-50 46.7% 49.8% 53.1% 56.6% 61.6% 65.6% 70.0% 74.6% 79.7%
2051-55 46.7% 49.8% 53.1% 56.6% 61.3% 65.4% 69.7% 74.3% 79.3%
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Table 11: Gross replacement ratio; native self-employed; base scenario.
Source: Author’s calculations
Retirement age 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
Years of contributions 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
2001-05 66.3% 68.7% 71.1% 73.5% 74.0% 76.2% 78.5% 80.7% 83.0%
2006-10 65.9% 68.3% 70.7% 73.1% 73.7% 75.9% 78.2% 80.4% 82.7%
2011-15 65.9% 68.4% 70.9% 73.4% 73.6% 75.9% 78.3% 80.6% 83.0%
2016-20 49.3% 51.2% 53.1% 55.2% 56.6% 58.9% 61.3% 63.9% 66.7%
2021-25 44.1% 46.0% 48.1% 50.2% 52.1% 54.5% 57.1% 59.8% 62.8%
2026-30 38.5% 40.5% 42.5% 44.7% 47.0% 49.6% 52.2% 55.1% 58.2%
2031-35 31.5% 33.5% 35.6% 37.9% 41.1% 43.8% 46.7% 49.8% 53.1%
2036-40 29.6% 31.6% 33.6% 35.8% 39.8% 42.5% 45.3% 48.3% 51.6%
2041-45 28.8% 30.7% 32.7% 34.9% 37.9% 40.5% 43.1% 46.0% 49.2%
2046-50 28.3% 30.2% 32.2% 34.3% 37.3% 39.8% 42.4% 45.2% 48.3%
2051-55 28.3% 30.2% 32.2% 34.3% 37.2% 39.6% 42.2% 45.0% 48.0%
Even if the reforms are not sufficient to reach the equilibrium of the pension system,
Tables 8 and 9 and Tables 10 and 11 (concerning respectively the rate of return on
contributions and the gross replacement ratio) show the strong reduction in the gen-
erosity of the pension system induced by the application of the contribution based
method.
The previous tables show another important aspect of the Dini reform. The actual
situation is very convenient for self-employed workers since they receive pension
benefits computed with a rule similar to salaried workers while they pay contributions
on the basis of a lower rate (20% vs. 33%). This explains the reason behind the
high level of the rates on return on contributions for self-employed workers with
respect to the salaried workers when the earning based method is applied, even if
the replacement ratios are similar. However, when the contribution based method is
applied, pension benefits are perfectly related to contributions and the replacement
ratio for self-employed workers will strongly reduce.
Finally, Table 12 shows the decomposition of the pension expenditure into direct
pensions, disability benefits and indirect pensions paid to salaried workers and self-
employed workers. We can see that in all the three cases the important increase in the
total pension expenditure in the next decades is driven by the rise in the direct pen-
sions paid to salaried workers while, for the other categories, the pension expenditure
is essentially under control.
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Table 12: Pension expenditure / GDP.
Source: Author’s calculations
2001-05 2006-10 2011-15 2021-25 2031-35 2041-45 2051-55
Base 8.09% 8.05% 8.03% 8.53% 9.19% 9.29% 8.50%
Direct pensions Berl 8.09% 7.76% 7.45% 8.11% 9.00% 9.23% 8.48%
Prodi 8.09% 7.91% 7.60% 8.33% 9.14% 9.35% 8.49%
Base 0.61% 0.61% 0.60% 0.62% 0.69% 0.72% 0.66%
Employees Disability benefits Berl 0.61% 0.61% 0.60% 0.63% 0.71% 0.76% 0.70%
Prodi 0.61% 0.61% 0.60% 0.62% 0.69% 0.74% 0.69%
Base 1.82% 1.81% 1.81% 1.87% 2.08% 2.19% 2.03%
Indirect pensions Berl 1.82% 1.80% 1.79% 1.87% 2.13% 2.30% 2.15%
Prodi 1.82% 1.81% 1.79% 1.85% 2.08% 2.24% 2.10%
Base 1.89% 1.89% 1.83% 1.80% 1.84% 1.82% 1.64%
Direct pensions Berl 1.89% 1.85% 1.77% 1.77% 1.85% 1.84% 1.66%
Prodi 1.89% 1.85% 1.76% 1.76% 1.84% 1.83% 1.65%
Base 0.26% 0.27% 0.26% 0.26% 0.29% 0.32% 0.30%
Self-employed Disability benefits Berl 0.26% 0.27% 0.26% 0.26% 0.30% 0.33% 0.32%
Prodi 0.26% 0.27% 0.26% 0.26% 0.29% 0.32% 0.31%
Base 0.30% 0.30% 0.29% 0.29% 0.31% 0.33% 0.30%
Indirect pensions Berl 0.30% 0.30% 0.29% 0.29% 0.32% 0.34% 0.32%
Prodi 0.30% 0.30% 0.29% 0.29% 0.32% 0.33% 0.31%
Finally, the evolution of pension deficits clearly affects the evolution of the income
tax rate τt (see Figure 21). This is related to the fact that the income tax rate is
endogenously determined at each period in order to keep constant the ratio of the
public debt to GDP. By comparing Figures 19 and 21, we can note that the time paths
of the income tax rate and of the ratio of pension system deficit to GDP, in the three
scenarios, are very similar. For example, in the short run and medium run, recent
pension reforms by reducing pension deficits, and then public deficits, authorize a
reduction of the income tax rate with respect to the base scenario.
Figure 21: Income tax rate, normalized to 1 in 2001-2005
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5.3. Generational accounting
We now use the generational accounting approach introduced by Auerbach et al.
(1994) to evaluate the gains and the losses for each generation associated with the
introduction of the Berlusconi and the Prodi reforms. For each generation, we com-
pute the ratio of the expected present value of the revenues (pension benefits and
per capita government expenditure) to the expected present value of the payments
(income taxes and social security contributions).
As shown in Table 13, the first generation considered in the generational account-
ing analysis is that born in the period 1926-1930, while the last one is that born in
the period 1996-2000. The analysis concerns only native salaried workers who start
working at 22.
In the base scenario, all the generations stop working at 58. In the simulation con-
cerning the Berlusconi reform, all the generations born before 1946 stop working
at 58, the generation born in the period 1946-1950 stops working at 61, and all the
generations born after 1950 stop working at 62. In the simulation concerning the
Berlusconi reform, all the generations born before 1946 stop working at 58, the gen-
eration born in the period 1946-1950 stops working at 59, and all the generations
born after 1950 stop working at 61.
Table 13: Generations considered in the generational accounting analysis
Base Berl Prodi
year of birth retirement age year of retiring retirement age year of retiring retirement age year of retiring
1926-30 58 1984-88 58 1984-88 58 1984-88
1931-35 58 1989-93 58 1989-93 58 1989-93
1936-40 58 1994-98 58 1994-98 58 1994-98
1941-45 58 1999-03 58 1999-03 58 1999-03
1946-50 58 2004-08 61 2007-11 59 2005-09
1951-55 58 2009-13 62 2013-17 61 2012-16
1956-60 58 2014-18 62 2018-22 61 2017-21
1961-65 58 2019-23 62 2023-27 61 2022-26
1966-70 58 2024-28 62 2028-32 61 2027-31
1971-75 58 2029-33 62 2033-37 61 2032-36
1976-80 58 2034-38 62 2038-42 61 2037-41
1981-85 58 2039-43 62 2043-47 61 2042-46
1986-90 58 2044-48 62 2048-52 61 2047-51
1991-95 58 2049-53 62 2053-57 61 2052-56
1996-00 58 2054-58 62 2058-62 61 2057-61
The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 22. First of all, by considering the
base case, we note that the value of this index decreases starting from the generation
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born in the period 1956-1960. The reason of this decrease is the reduction of the
generosity of the pension system related to the introduction of the pro-rata method
and the contribution based method, and the strong increase in the income tax rate
necessary to keep constant the ratio between the public debt and the GDP (see Figure
21).
With respect to the base case, the Berlusconi reform causes a sharp fall of the index
for the generation born in 1946-1950, which is the first generation who must work
until 61, while with the Prodi reform the reduction of the index begins for the gen-
eration born in 1951-1955. It is important to note that the generations born in the
periods 1946-1950 and 1951-1955 are the first generations forced to pay more con-
tributions and they receive a pension computed with the earning based method which
implies, as we have already seen, that the increase in the value of their pension benefit
is not much important. In contrast, the following generations are forced to pay more
contributions, but receive a pension benefit computed with the pro-rata method or
the contribution based method; for these generations, therefore, the increase in pen-
sion benefits is more significant and the difference between the three indexes tends
to shrink. Observe, however, that the value of the index remains significantly lower
with respect to the base case in the scenarios with increased retirement age.
Figure 22: Expected present value of revenues / Expected present value of payments
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We can conclude that the Berlusconi and the Prodi reforms have a positive impact
on the pension system in the medium term but, after 2040, they appear completely
ineffective: the increase in the retirement age does not induce a reduction of pension
system deficits, which remain of about 1.7% of GDP. Moreover, these reforms imply
important losses for the next generations.
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6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
6.1. Immigration
We now analyze the robustness of our results concerning the Prodi reform introduced
in 2007. The first element of uncertainty that we consider concerns the demographic
evolution by focusing on the role played by immigration. The base case assumes
that immigrants of the second generation have the same fertility rates as natives. We
consider here the case in which immigrants of the second generation have the same
fertility rates as their parents, i.e. the double of fertility rates compared to the natives.
As Figures 23 and 24 show, this scenario has important effects on the demographic
evolution by reducing the old-age dependency ratio and by increasing the working
age population.
Figure 23: Old-age dependency ratio
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Figure 24: Working age population
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Even if this scenario implies, with respect to the Prodi reform, a reduction in future
wages induced by the increase in the labour supply (see Figures 25 and 26), it de-
termines an important reduction of the ratio between the pension system deficits and
GDP since 2030 (Figure 27). In particular, this scenario implies in 2055 a reduction
of this ratio of about 0.5 percentage points.
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Figure 25: Employment rate
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Figure 26: Wage, per unit of effective labor
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Figure 27: Pension system deficit / GDP
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The previous simulation shows the importance of immigration as a key element that
affects the sustainability of the pension system. As a consequence, we can imagine
immigration as a policy tool that could be used in order to balance the pension system
in the long run.
We consider here a scenario in which additional migrants enter Italy starting from
the period 2026-2030. In particular, in the periods 2026-2030 and 2051-2055, we
assume 250,000 additional immigrants per year, while between 2031 and 2050 (i.e.
when the size of pension deficits is larger) we suppose more important flows, as
shown in Figure 28.
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Figure 28: Number of yearly immigrants
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Figures 29 and 30 show the demographic implications of this policy: the increase of
the weight of immigrants on the total population (more than 30% vs. 18% in the base
case) and the reduction of the old-age dependency ratio.
Figure 29: Immigrants / Total population
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Figure 30: Old-age dependency ratio
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
2001-05 2006-10 2011-15 2016-20 2021-25 2026-30 2031-35 2036-40 2041-45 2046-50 2051-55
Base case Immigration policy
The economic effects of this reform are many. The effect on the GDP growth rate
(Figure 31) is positive from the period 2026-2030 onwards, i.e. since the immigration
policy is applied. Before, the negative effect on economic growth is related to an
expectation mechanism. Individuals, indeed, expect a future reduction in tax levels
thanks to the reduction in pension deficits due to the immigration policy. The increase
in future expected incomes induces individuals, when the information is available (in
the period 2006-2010), to increase consumption and leisure demand. The reduction
of savings (and thus of capital accumulation) and of labor supply explain the initial
reduction of GDP growth rate. Moreover, by stimulating labor supply, this policy
reduces wages with respect to the base case (Figure 32).
Another important economic aspect is the effect on the productivity growth rate that
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depends on the weighted average of the stocks of human capital of each age class
working at the same period (see Equation (6)). Given that immigrants are supposed
to be less productive than natives, the immigration policy has a negative effect on the
productivity growth rate, as shown in Figure 33. In particular, in 2055, the difference
would be equal to 0.16%.
The effects on the pension system (see Figure 34) are positive starting from the period
2026-2030 and the immigration policy allows to balance the pension system in 2055.
Before 2025, the negative effect is explained by the evolution of GDP in the first
periods.
Figure 31: GDP growth rate
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Figure 32: Wage, per unit of effective labor
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Figure 33: Productivity growth rate
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Figure 34: Pension system deficit / GDP
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6.2. Pension benefits
One important element of uncertainty in our simulation exercise concerns the value
of pension benefits. The uncertainty is related to the fact that the Dini reform (Law
335/1995) states that the transformation coefficients used in the computation of pen-
sion benefits, with the contribution based method and the pro-rata method, must be
updated every ten years according to economic and demographic evolutions, in par-
ticular the increase in life expectancy. In 2005, i.e. ten years after the introduction of
the Dini reform, no revision of the transformation coefficients were made, reflecting
the enormous difficulty in the Italian political context, to reform the pension system
penalizing the retirees.
However, in 2007, the Prodi reform (Law 247/2007) appointed a commission of
ten experts supposed to propose new criteria for the determination of the transfor-
mation coefficients, by December 2008. The new criteria would take into account
the macroeconomic and demographic evolutions, the relationship between life ex-
pectancy and retirement age, and the persistency of career paths. At the same time
the Law 247/2007 introduced new transformation coefficients that thus replace those
of 1995.23 Given that these new coefficients will be applied with the pro-rata method,
i.e. starting from 2015, and given the pressure that the national trade unions will ex-
ert in next years, the probability that they will be effectively applied without any
modifications before 2015 is not so high in our opinion.
In the following simulation we compare the Prodi scenario with a scenario in which
we assume that the new coefficients introduced by the Law 247/2007 will effectively
replace the previous ones. As shown in Table 14, the new coefficients are from 6
to 8% lower than the previous ones, implying a reduction in the same proportion in
pension benefits.
23The new coefficients are computed by considering data about life expectancy of 2002 (instead of
1990), probabilities to die leaving survivors of 2002 (instead of 1989), surviving spouse’s probabilities
to die or to get new marriage of 2002 (instead of 1990).
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Table 14: Transformation coefficients (Law 335/1995 and Law 247/2007)
Old coefficients New coefficients % variation
57 4.720% 4.419% -6.4%
58 4.860% 4.538% -6.6%
59 5.006% 4.664% -6.8%
60 5.163% 4.798% -7.1%
61 5.334% 4.940% -7.4%
62 5.514% 5.093% -7.6%
63 5.706% 5.257% -7.9%
64 5.911% 5.432% -8.1%
65 6.136% 5.620% -8.4%
The macroeconomic effects of a reduction of the generosity of a PAYGO pension
system are well known: the forward looking behavior together with the rational ex-
pectations hypothesis imply that, when the information is available, agents react to a
future reduction in pension benefits by saving more. This induces a better evolution
of the ratio between investments and GDP (Figure 35), a greater capital accumulation
and a greater economic growth (Figure 36).
Figure 35: Investments / GDP
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Figure 36: GDP growth rate
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The simulation exercise shows (see Figures 37 and 38) that the revision of the trans-
formation coefficients is a good tool in order to guarantee the sustainability of the
pension system. In 2055, the pension system deficit would be equal to 0.8% of GDP,
i.e. a half than in the base case. This result suggests that further revisions of the
transformation coefficients would permit to completely solve the financial problems
of the Italian pension system.
Clearly, from a political point of view, the problem is that such a policy implies that
the burden is completely born by the retirees. Table 15 compares, for native salaried
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Figure 37: Pension system deficit / GDP
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Figure 38: Pension system expenditure / GDP
12%
13%
14%
15%
16%
1996-00 2001-05 2006-10 2011-15 2016-20 2021-25 2026-30 2031-35 2036-40 2041-45 2046-50 2051-55
Prodi New coefficients
workers, the replacement ratios with and without the revision of the transformation
coefficients. For example, in 2055, the reduction of the replacement ratio would be
7% for those who retire at 61, 7.5% for those who retire at 63, and 8% for those who
retire at 65. Note that the percentage reductions in the replacement ratios are a little
bit less important with respect to the ones displayed in Table 15. This is related to
the fact that the reduction of the generosity of the pension system induces a better
evolution of wages and GDP allowing a (small) positive effect on pension benefits
that partially compensates for the reduction of the transformation coefficients.
Table 15: Gross replacement ratio; native employees. Source: Author’s calculations
Retirement age 61 63 65
Years of contributions 39 41 43
Prodi New coeff % variation Prodi New coeff % variation Prodi New coeff % variation
2006-10 77.5% 77.5% 0.0% 82.1% 82.1% 0.0% 86.8% 86.8% 0.0%
2011-15 77.5% 77.5% 0.0% 81.8% 81.8% 0.0% 86.1% 86.2% 0.1%
2016-20 75.9% 72.9% -4.0% 83.2% 79.4% -4.6% 91.6% 86.9% -5.2%
2021-25 74.4% 70.7% -4.9% 82.4% 77.9% -5.5% 91.7% 86.2% -6.1%
2026-30 71.5% 67.4% -5.8% 80.1% 75.0% -6.3% 89.8% 83.6% -6.9%
2031-35 69.3% 64.4% -7.2% 78.6% 72.6% -7.6% 89.4% 82.1% -8.2%
2036-40 66.8% 62.1% -7.1% 75.9% 70.1% -7.6% 86.4% 79.3% -8.1%
2041-45 63.0% 58.7% -6.7% 71.6% 66.4% -7.2% 81.5% 75.2% -7.8%
2046-50 61.9% 57.8% -6.6% 70.4% 65.3% -7.1% 80.1% 73.9% -7.7%
2051-55 61.8% 57.5% -7.0% 70.2% 65.0% -7.5% 79.9% 73.5% -8.0%
However, a generational accounting analysis (Figure 39) shows that the reduction
in pension benefits does not penalize future generations with respect to the Prodi
scenario, i.e. without the revision of the transformation coefficients. The ratio be-
tween the expected present value of the revenues and the expected present value of
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the payments is essentially the same in the case of the revision of the transformation
coefficients as in the case of the Prodi scenario without the revision. This result is
due to a general equilibrium effect implied by this policy, in fact, the reduction in
pension deficits originated by the revision of the transformation coefficients permits
to reduce the general taxation. For future generations, the present value of the reduc-
tion in pension benefits is equal to the present value of the reduction in taxation. It is
clear that if we neglect this general equilibrium effect on taxation, the revision of the
coefficients would lead to an important loss for future generations.
Figure 39: Expected present value of revenues / Expected present value of payments
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6.3. Small open economy
In the previous sections we made the assumption that Italy is a closed economy.
Thus, the interest rate was endogenously determined in the domestic capital market in
order to equalize the domestic demand and supply of capital. The choice of a closed-
economy context was related to the fact that all developed countries face an important
ageing phenomenon that will deeply affect the world interest rate. Consequently, the
small-open-economy assumption, that underlies a fixed interest rate at a constant
world level, is not adequate in an ageing context.
However, in a context of globalized financial markets, one can seemingly state that
the closed-economy assumption is also not plausible. One possible solution is to
consider Italy a small open economy and to fix the interest rate at a level compatible
with a world ageing context.
In this section, we assume that the evolution of the interest rate generated in our base
case is compatible with a world ageing context. We simulate again the Berlusconi
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and Prodi reforms by assuming that Italy is a small open economy where the interest
rate is fixed at the level computed in the base scenario.
As we have already seen in a closed-economy context, the Berlusconi and Prodi
reforms induce an increase in the domestic interest rate (see Figure 12) since the
increase in the retirement age stimulates the labor supply and reduces savings. Ac-
cordingly, when the Italian economy is open, it is straightforward to understand how
capital moves. In the new simulations, the interest rate is fixed at the level obtained in
the base case. This implies that foreign capitals must enter Italy in order to increase
capital supply and equalize the net domestic interest rate at the world level. Figure
40 shows the evolution of the importance of the foreign assets in financing physical
capital and bonds in the Berlusconi and Prodi scenarios.24
Figure 40: Cumulated capital inflows as a proportion of total assets
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In what follows, the analysis is carried out by comparing the base scenario and the
Prodi scenario (both in a closed-economy context) with the Prodi scenario in an open-
economy context.25
The macroeconomic effect of increasing the retirement age when the economy is
open is very positive for the following reasons:
- The capital inflows from the rest of the world (necessary to keep the ratio capi-
tal/labour and the interest rate at the level computed in the base scenario) allow
for an important additional accumulation of physical capital.
24In an open economy, the assets demanded by the firms and the government are financed not only
by the aggregate household wealth but also by foreign assets.
25The results concerning the Berlusconi reform (both in a closed and in an open economy) are not
represented here because the effects of opening the economy when the Berlusconi reform is applied are
very similar to the effects when the Prodi reform is applied.
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- The Prodi reform, by increasing the retirement age, induces an increase in the em-
ployment rate. In a closed economy, the increase in the employment rate is
partially compensated by the decrease (with respect to the base case) in the
wage per unit of effective labor, that induces an increase in the demand for
leisure. On the contrary, in an open economy, the wage per unit of effective la-
bor remains equal to the level in the base case. This implies that the demand for
leisure does not increase and explains the reason behind the very high positive
effect on employment compared to the closed scenario (see Figure 41).
- The increase in the retirement age, and thus in the overall lifetime spent working,
induces young people to devote additional time to human capital accumula-
tion. In a closed economy, the positive effect in human capital accumulation is
partially compensated by the decrease (with respect to the base case) in future
wages per unit of effective labor and the increase in future interest rates since
they reduce the present value of future gains obtained with the investment in
education. On the contrary, in an open economy, the wage per unit of effec-
tive labor and the interest rate remain equal to the level in the base case. This
implies that the partial compensation does not operate and explains the highly
positive effect on human capital accumulation (see Figure 42). The greater
investment in human capital implies a positive impact on the evolution of the
productivity growth rate (see Figure 43).
Figure 41: Employment rate
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Figure 42: Time devoted to schooling
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Figure 43: Productivity growth rate
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The analysis of the Prodi reform in an open-economy context with respect to a closed-
economy scenario shows a better evolution of the employment rate and a productivity
growth rate. Moreover, given the importance of foreign assets inflows, the effect on
economic growth will also be very positive. Figure 44 shows the effect on the GDP
growth rate.
Figure 44: GDP growth rate
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Furthermore, even in terms of pensions financing, the effects of increasing retirement
age in a context of open economy is positive (see Figure 45). This is not due to a
reduction in the generosity of the pension system, but to the very important increase
in GDP.26 However, we can note that, even in this favorable scenario, the deficit of
the pension system will sharply increase between 2015 and 2040.
26In fact, as shown in Table 16, the replacement ratios in the open economy scenario increase with
respect to the closed economy scenario.
53
CEPII, Working Paper No 2008 – 25
Figure 45: Pension system deficit / GDP
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Table 16: Gross replacement ratio; native employees. Source: Author’s calculations
Retirement age 61 63 65
Years of contributions 39 41 43
Prodi_closed Prodi_open % variation Prodi_closed Prodi_open % variation Prodi_closed Prodi_open % variation
1996-00 77.8% 77.8% 0.0% 82.3% 82.3% 0.0% 86.8% 86.8% 0.0%
2001-05 77.5% 77.5% 0.0% 82.1% 82.2% 0.1% 86.8% 86.9% 0.1%
2006-10 77.5% 77.7% 0.2% 81.8% 82.6% 0.8% 86.1% 87.6% 1.5%
2011-15 75.9% 76.2% 0.3% 83.2% 83.9% 0.6% 91.6% 92.6% 1.0%
2016-20 74.4% 75.7% 1.3% 82.4% 83.9% 1.5% 91.7% 93.4% 1.6%
2021-25 71.5% 73.2% 1.6% 80.1% 81.8% 1.7% 89.8% 91.7% 1.9%
2026-30 69.3% 71.2% 1.8% 78.6% 80.6% 2.0% 89.4% 91.5% 2.1%
2031-35 66.8% 68.5% 1.7% 75.9% 77.7% 1.8% 86.4% 88.3% 2.0%
2036-40 63.0% 66.5% 3.5% 71.6% 75.5% 3.9% 81.5% 85.9% 4.4%
2041-45 61.9% 64.5% 2.6% 70.4% 73.3% 2.9% 80.1% 83.4% 3.3%
2046-50 61.8% 62.0% 0.2% 70.2% 70.4% 0.2% 79.9% 80.1% 0.2%
To sum, in the case of open economy, the introduction of a reform that increases the
retirement age has very positive effects. This pension reform, in fact, involves capital
inflows from the rest of the world that stimulate economic growth and reduce the ratio
of pension deficits to GDP, by implying that pension imbalances are now financed by
the rest of world. Of course this analysis is correct only if we assume that the rest
of the world does not carry out similar pension reforms. On the contrary, if also the
rest of the world increases the retirement age, the world interest rate increases (more
or less as the Italian interest rate in the case of closed economy) and this implies
no foreign capital flows towards Italy. Hence, the closed-economy and small-open-
economy cases should be considered as extreme scenarios that define the range of
possible outcomes for Italy.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
The reforms introduced during the Nineties (the Amato reform in 1992 and the Dini
reform in 1995) imply a strong penalization for people who pay low amounts of con-
tributions (in particular people who retire at 57 and self-employed workers). How-
ever, these reforms fail to ensure long-run solvability of the Italian pension system
and, during the transition phase, the pension system would produce deficits as high
as 3-5% of GDP. For this reason, in 2004, the Berlusconi government introduced a
reform that increases the minimum retirement age to 60 years after 2008. In 2007,
the Prodi government replaced the previous reform by a softer one implying that the
minimum retirement age is fixed at 58 from 2008 and will gradually increase over
time up to 62.
The objective of this paper is to provide an evaluation of the impacts of these reforms
by using an applied overlapping-generations general equilibrium model. We show
that the increase in the retirement age will induce a significant improvement of the
financial conditions of the pension system, but only in the short and in the medium
run. After 2040, the positive effect related to the increase in the labor supply, and
then in contributions paid by the workers, is compensated by the increase in the value
of pension benefits perceived by people forced to postpone retirement. The increase
in the retirement age has no positive impact on the financial conditions of the pension
system from 2045 onwards, and the pension deficit remains at about 1.7% of GDP in
2055.
From the point of view of equity among generations, the generational accounting ap-
proach shows that, with respect to the base scenario, the increase in the retirement age
will cause an important loss for the generations forced to work more, especially for
the generations born in the periods 1946-1950 and 1951-1955 who receive pension
benefits computed with the earning based method.
We have also shown the sensitivity of our results to the hypothesis concerning im-
migration. In particular, we analyzed a scenario in which also the second-generation
immigrants display fertility rates higher than those of natives, and a scenario in which
the government introduces an ambitious immigration policy. In both cases, immigra-
tion permits to reduce the old-age dependency ratio and can be seen as an instrument
that can be used to guarantee the long-term solvability of the pension system.
Then we analyzed an important aspect of the Dini reform (1995). The transformation
coefficients used in the computation of the pension benefits with the pro-rata method
and the contribution based method are supposed to be updated every ten years accord-
ing to the evolution of many elements, especially the increase in life expectancy. In
55
CEPII, Working Paper No 2008 – 25
2005, i.e. when the first revision would have been made and near national elections,
nothing happened. In 2007, the Prodi government proposed new (reduced) transfor-
mation coefficients, but (i) at the same time the Prodi reform appointed a commis-
sion that will propose before December 2008 new criteria for the determination of the
transformation coefficients (ii) the transformation coefficients will be applied starting
from 2015, i.e. with the pro-rata method. This suggests that the new transformation
coefficients are likely to be modified before 2015. In any case, we have shown that
the transformation coefficients proposed with the Prodi reform would permit a strong
reduction in pension deficits. Moreover, even if this implies important income losses
for the retirees, a generational accounting analysis shown that the future generations
will not be penalized, since the loss in pension benefits will be compensated by a
lower taxation.
In the last sensitivity analysis, Italy is treated as a small open economy. By assum-
ing that the evolution of the interest rate generated in the base scenario is compatible
with a world ageing context, we simulated the Prodi reform in a small-open-economy
scenario where the interest rate is exogenously fixed and the saving-investment gap
is filled by international capital flows. We show that, with respect to the closed-
economy scenario, the increase of the retirement age in a small-open-economy sce-
nario allows an important increase in the economic activity and a reduction of the
ratio of pension deficits to GDP. However, even in this favorable scenario, the deficit
of the pension system increases by 1.5% of GDP by 2030 horizon compared to 2001-
2005 (hence the deficit is more than doubled).
Finally, if we compare the Italian case (where the population ageing problem is one
of the most serious in the world) to other European cases, we can see that the recent
reforms introduced in Italy are very important to avoid a strong increase in pension
expenditures. In general, most European countries have recently increased the min-
imum retirement age, introduced some forms of penalization in case of early retire-
ment and introduced an indexation mechanism of pensions related to prices rather to
wages. For instance in France, where the demographic problem is less serious than
in Italy, the results of the simulations realized by Chateau et al. show that the Fillon
reform,27 combined with an assumed rise in activity rates of elder workers, ensure
the solvability of pension regimes in France only until 2025. After 2025, the French
pension system will generate important deficits that exceed 3% of the GDP starting
from 2040. The total pension expenditure will increase constantly in the period 2005-
27The Fillon reform (2003) introduced (1) a progressive increase of the period necessary to obtain a
full replacement ratio (50% of the reference wage) from 40 to 42 years in the private sector and from
37.5 to 42 years in the public sector, (2) a change in the penalty applied to workers of the private sector
and introduction of a penalty applied to workers of the public sector, (3) the indexation of public sector
pensions on prices rather than wages.
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2050 from 12.6% to 16.6% of the GDP. Moreover, if France is considered as a closed
economy, the results would be worse and the total pension expenditure could reach
17.8% of the GDP in 2055. This comparison permits to note that the reforms intro-
duced in Italy, even if they are not sufficient to ensure the long-term equilibrium, are
much more efficient than the one introduced in France, where the demographic prob-
lem is less serious than in Italy. Of course, the cost related to this greater efficiency
is the strong reduction of the generosity of the Italian pension system determined by
the Amato and Dini reforms.
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